报告时间：2024-12-19 15:00
报告地点：工程管理与智能制造研究中心1325会议室
报告人：陈虹桥 副教授
工作单位：南京大学
报告人简介：
陈虹桥，南京大学工程管理学院准聘副教授，博士毕业于中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院，期间受国家留学基金委资助赴多伦多大学Rotman管理学院联合培养，加入南京大学之前，曾在香港中文大学、香港理工大学学习和访问。研究方向包括收益管理、排队博弈、供应链管理等。以第一/通讯作者身份在Manufacturing & ServiceOperations Management、Production and Operations Management、Naval Research Logistics、International Transactions in Operational Research、管理工程学报等国内外知名学术期刊上发表多篇学术论文。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目和教育部人文社科青年项目各一项，参与国家自然科学基金面上项目多项。获2023年度M&SOM最佳论文提名奖、第四届全国供应链与运营管理学术年会最佳论文三等奖、第十五届行为运筹学与行为运营管理国际研讨会青年教师优秀论文奖。
报告简介：
In platform economy, service providers often engage in both demand and supply competition. This competition can be either farsighted or myopic, depending on how the platforms anticipate the reactions of their rivals. Farsighted platforms consider the chains of reactions following their initial deviation and the long-term consequences of their actions, while myopic platforms only focus on the immediate payoff change of their one-step deviation. We consider two scenarios: the platforms engage in demand competition only or in both demand and supply competition. For each scenario, we first determine the equilibrium of worker-customer subgame, and then consider the stable outcomes for the service pricing decisions. For the farsighted stability, we follow the concept of the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Specifically, we establish the Pareto efficiency and then verify the indirectly dominance to obtain the farsightedly stable outcomes.
