报告人简介：

陈建清教授，现任Jindal School of Management，The University of Texas at Dallas副教授（终身），曾任Haskayne School of Business，The University of Calgary助理教授。陈建清教授博士毕业于McCombs School of Business，The University of Texas at Austin，学士和硕士毕业于清华大学。主要从事电子商务，信息系统的经济学和供应链管理方面的研究工作。目前致力于研究以下问题：（1）社交媒体和用户生成的内容；（2）搜索引擎广告；（3）平台业务模式；（4）供应链风险管理。 其研究成果刊登在《Information Systems Research》,《MIS Quarterly》,《Journal of Marketing Research》,《Journal of Marketing》,《Production and Operations Management》,《Journal of Management Information Systems》,《Economics Letters, Decision Analysis》和《Decision Support Systems》等国际顶级学术期刊上。目前担任《Information Systems Research》和《Journal of Electronic Commerce Research》 副主编。

报告内容简介：

We study compatibility decisions of two competing platform owners that generate profits through both hardware sales and royalties from content sales. We consider a game-theoretic model in which the platform hardware may offer different standalone utility to users who have different preferences over the two platforms. We find that incentives to establish one-way compatibility---the platform owner with smaller standalone value grants access to its proprietary content application to users of the competing platform---can arise from the difference in their profit foci. As the difference in the standalone utility increases, royalties from content sales become less important to the platform owner with greater standalone value but become more important to the other platform owner. Compatibility can thus increase asymmetry between the platform owners' profit foci and, given a sufficiently large difference in the standalone utility, yields greater profits for both platform owners. We further show that social welfare is greater under one-way compatibility than under incompatibility and that there are no incentives for either platform owner to establish one-way compatibility the other way round such that the platform owner with greater standalone value grants access to its proprietary content application to users of the competing platform. We also investigate how factors such as platform production costs, exclusive content, heterogeneous intensities of content consumption, multihoming consumers, endogenized royalties, and correlation in consumer preferences for hardware and software affect compatibility incentives.